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Key facts
2.2m
number of people 
identifi ed as clinically 
extremely vulnerable (CEV) 
by 7 May 2020
510,486
number of CEV people who 
asked for and received at 
least one food box
£308m
cost of shielding to 
1 August 2020
1.3 million number of CEV people added to the shielded patient list 
(the List) and formally eligible for central support through 
the shielding programme by 12 April
900,000 additional people added to the List between 18 April and 7 May 
as GPs and clinicians completed the necessary clinical review. 
The List continues to be updated.
375,000 number of CEV people who could not be reached because 
of missing or inaccurate telephone numbers within NHS 
patient records 
5 number of days between the start of shielding and deliveries 
of the fi rst food boxes
4.7 million number of food boxes delivered between 27 March and 
1 August 2020
94% of CEV people reported that overall, they were following 
shielding guidance mostly or completely (14 May) 
Not known whether the shielding programme led to fewer deaths of 
those advised to shield than otherwise would have been the 
case when compared with an age-matched sample of the 
general population
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Summary
1 On 22 March 2020, the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and 
Local Government announced that those people in England who faced the highest 
risk of being hospitalised by COVID-19 should shield themselves and stay at home. 
This marked the start of shielding. Government guidance urged people considered 
clinically extremely vulnerable (CEV) to the virus to not leave their homes for 
12 weeks and not go out for shopping, travel or leisure.
2 The objective of the shielding programme (the Programme) was to minimise 
mortality and severe illness among those who are CEV by providing them with public 
health guidance and support to stay at home and avoid all non-essential contact. 
Through the shielding programme, CEV people could get support accessing food, 
medicine and basic care.
3 At the start of shielding, on 22 March, government anticipated 1.5 million 
people to be classified as CEV, but by 7 May it had identified some 2.2 million CEV 
people as formally eligible for central support through the shielding programme. 
Government considered people with specific medical conditions as being most 
vulnerable to COVID-19 based on a clinical understanding of the virus at the time. 
These conditions initially included some respiratory illnesses and specific cancers.
4 The Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government (MHCLG) had 
overall responsibility for overseeing and delivering the Programme. The Department 
of Health & Social Care (DHSC) was responsible for determining who should 
shield, evaluating the health impact of shielding and determining and issuing 
clinical advice. NHS Digital was responsible for producing the list of people who 
were to be advised to shield and working with GP systems’ suppliers on any 
required changes. The Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs (Defra) 
led on providing food to people shielding. NHS England & NHS Improvement 
(NHSE&I) ran the service to get medicines to people using local pharmacies and 
enhanced support to CEV people through the NHS Volunteer Responder service. 
The Government Digital Service (GDS) was responsible for creating and running the 
digital service, which consisted of a website, an automated telephone helpline and 
other services required to collect, store and share information on the support needs 
of CEV people. The Department for Work & Pensions (DWP) provided a national 
shielding contact centre.
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5 Local authorities were responsible for contacting difficult to reach CEV people 
and distributed emergency food supplies (paid for by Defra) in the initial stages of 
shielding while national food distribution was being put in place. They were also 
responsible for providing basic care for those CEV people who requested this 
support, and arranging help and support for CEV people if a more tailored approach 
was needed, for example, if food boxes did not meet cultural or dietary requirements.
6 National shielding advice was paused in England on 1 August, although it 
continued in some areas in local lockdown, on clinical advice from the chief medical 
officer. DHSC issued new guidance for CEV people on 5 November as the second 
lockdown started in England, and again for the third lockdown which started in 
January 2021. This guidance strongly advised CEV people to work at home and to 
stay at home as much as possible, except to go outdoors for exercise or to attend 
essential health appointments.
7 This report looks at how effectively government identified and met the needs of 
clinically extremely vulnerable people to 1 August 2020. This report only examines 
the support provided through the shielding programme and does not include wider 
support to CEV people, such as statutory sick pay. This report sets out:
• the inception of the shielding programme (Part One);
• identifying clinically extremely vulnerable people (Part Two);
• supporting clinically extremely vulnerable people (Part Three); and
• outcomes and lessons learned (Part Four).
We set out our audit approach and evidence base in Appendices One and Two, 
the clinical criteria of CEV people in Appendix Three and our assessment of the 
commercial arrangements in the Programme in Appendix Four.
8 The Programme was set up just before the UK went into the first lockdown 
in March in response to an urgent and unprecedented need to support vulnerable 
people so they could shield. This was at a time of dramatic disruption to private lives, 
public service providers, including the NHS, and food supplies. Ministers were clear 
that shielding was imperative to protecting the lives and wellbeing of CEV people 
who were yet to be identified. How well the Programme could protect people’s lives 
and wellbeing depends on both the support provided and other factors such as 
individuals’ actions. Our evaluation of the Programme considers the circumstances 
in which it was set-up and operated, including what this meant for setting clear 
objectives and roles and responsibilities, and how lessons were learned.
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Key findings
The inception of the shielding programme
9 Government acted quickly in the absence of detailed contingency plans for 
identifying and supporting a large population advised to shield. In 2016, DHSC 
commissioned Public Health England to run Exercise Cygnus to assess the UK’s 
preparedness for an influenza pandemic and identify lessons. However, the testing 
of plans and policies for the identification and shielding of clinically extremely 
vulnerable people were not objectives of Exercise Cygnus. As a consequence, 
in early March 2020, government urgently needed to develop from scratch a new 
means to identify vulnerable people and arrange to support their needs in light of 
its advice to not leave their homes (paragraph 1.4).
10 Government decided to use a centrally directed model of support for CEV 
people. Faced with an immediate need to ensure reliable access to food, medicines 
and care for an anticipated 1.5 million people, ministers quickly commissioned 
a centrally directed programme, led by MHCLG, to support vulnerable people. 
Government chose a centrally directed model with local support rather than a wholly 
local approach. It did so because of government concerns about shortages in local 
food supplies, supermarket capacity and after briefly consulting a small number of 
local authorities. Government did not attempt to systematically assess the capacity 
or willingness of local authorities to provide a more local model of support as a 
thorough assessment would have been difficult in the time available (paragraph 1.5).
Identifying vulnerable people and their needs
11 CEV people were identified based on clinical judgement of the risk of severe 
illness or mortality from COVID-19. On 18 March, the four national chief medical 
officers finalised the interim list of conditions for who was to be advised to shield 
based on the limited clinical evidence on the virus available at the time. Protected 
characteristics such as ethnicity, age and gender were considered at the start 
and throughout the Programme, and were dealt with as the chief medical officers 
considered to be clinically appropriate (paragraph 2.3).
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12 At the start of the pandemic, there was no mechanism to allow a fast ‘sweep’ 
across all patients to identify, in real time, those who fell within a defined clinical 
category. NHS Digital used several datasets to compile the shielded patient list (the 
List): hospital data; GP patient data; prescribed medicines data; and maternity data. 
Because of the nature of the data, the process and the need to act quickly, several 
problems arose, including:
• the speed at which the List was developed (two days) meant NHS Digital relied 
on hospital, maternity and prescribed medicines data for the first iteration. 
Hospital data, while immediately available, were seven weeks out of date;
• hospital data did not always specify sufficient detail of people’s medical 
condition, leading to 126,000 people being added to the List in error and 
unnecessarily advised to shield;
• personal information, known to be missing or inaccurate (such as telephone 
numbers), caused problems when trying to contact people on the List; and
• local authorities told us that they received different ‘lists’ of CEV people who 
could not be contacted centrally which needed reconciling (paragraphs 2.4, 
2.8, 3.24 and figure 5).
13 By 12 April, three weeks after shielding was announced, some 1.3 million 
people were identified as clinically extremely vulnerable, advised to shield and 
formally eligible for central support through the Programme. Using hospital, maternity 
and prescribed medicines data, by 20 March NHS Digital initially identified some 
870,000 people who met the clinical criteria as CEV. After shielding was announced 
on 22 March, these people were sent letters advising them to shield and of their 
eligibility for central support through the Programme, for which they needed to 
register. NHS Digital subsequently identified a further 420,000 people formally 
eligible for central support by 12 April using GP patient data. The time taken to 
identify and communicate with these 1.3 million people by 12 April was largely down 
to the challenge of extracting usable data from different NHS and GP IT systems 
(paragraph 2.5 and Figures 1 and 6).
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14 A further 900,000 people were added to the List between 18 April and 7 May. 
The List continued to increase as GPs and clinicians in NHS trusts and NHS 
foundation trusts (trusts) completed the necessary clinical review of their patient 
lists. As part of the clinical decision making process set out by UK chief medical 
officers, they added or removed people based on their clinical judgement, local 
patient records, and as individuals’ medical conditions changed. Once changes 
had been made to IT systems to make the data available to GPs and trusts to 
review, they responded quickly, leading to further additions to the List from 18 April. 
The List stabilised at 2.2 million CEV people by 7 May by which time there were 
approximately 900,000 more people on the List than before GPs and trusts 
began their clinical review. People would not have been formally eligible for the 
central support of food boxes and medicines delivery offered through the shielding 
programme until they were on the List, but would have been able to ask their local 
authority for help. From March they would have been eligible to claim statutory 
sick pay if they were not able to work from home. People identified by trusts and 
GPs should have been advised to shield by their GP or trust as soon as they were 
considered CEV. The extent to which the List grew varied locally, with increases in 
the List ranging from 15% to 352% by local authority, between 12 April and 15 May 
(paragraphs 2.6, 2.7, 2.9 and Figures 6 and 8).
15 Government’s communications with CEV people were not always clear. 
Government had to communicate clearly, but quickly, with some 2.2 million people. 
Charities we spoke to criticised government’s communication with CEV people. On 
28 May, nearly 50 charities wrote an open letter to the minister for the Cabinet Office 
asking for clear communications with charities, health and care professionals, and 
local authorities to ensure consistency of advice given to those who were vulnerable 
(paragraphs 2.12 to 2.13).
Supporting CEV people
16 Government worked rapidly to create a range of ways that CEV people 
could register for the support they may need while shielding. Government 
wanted all CEV people to register whether they needed help or not. On 20 March, 
GDS was tasked to develop a digital service, which consisted of a website, an 
automated telephone helpline and other services required to collect, store and 
share information on the support needs of CEV people. This digital service was 
operational from 23 March. Government also commissioned a contact centre 
through DWP to call CEV people who had not yet registered through the website 
or the automated helpline. The contact centre started making calls on 28 March 
(paragraphs 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5, and Figure 9).
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17 The contact centre was unable to register 815,000 CEV people. GDS gave the 
contact centre the details of 1.8 million CEV people who had not registered through 
the website or automated helpline. However, the contact centre could not register 
nearly half of these CEV people. Of these, around 375,000 CEV people could not 
be reached because of missing or inaccurate telephone numbers within NHS patient 
records. While it was known to all parties that a proportion of telephone numbers in 
NHS records were missing or inaccurate, the Programme agreed to use telephone 
numbers from NHS records as a starting point to follow-up hard-copy letters. 
A further 440,000 declined to register for support when contacted; for example, 
they hung up or believed it was a nuisance call. From 28 April, GDS started passing 
details of the CEV people that could not be reached to local authorities to follow up 
(paragraphs 3.5 and 3.6, and Figure 10).
18 Defra quickly designed a food support service and identified suppliers 
who could deliver it. Defra consulted widely with industry from mid-March and 
considered a range of options, including supermarkets with delivery services and 
food wholesalers with distribution networks. Defra told us that industry engagement 
revealed that supermarkets were not able to meet anticipated demand in the time 
required, and Defra’s assessment was that only two wholesalers – Bidfood and 
Brakes – had the capability to source, pack and deliver the food supplies required 
(paragraph 3.7).
19 Defra used emergency procurement procedures and secured some reductions 
on initial prices. Defra used cost benchmarks and industry consultants to negotiate 
price reductions compared with the initial pricing quoted by providers. In return, 
Defra gave providers an increased notice period for contract termination, and took 
on more of the financial risk of maintaining enough stock levels to meet uncertain 
demand. The contracts included key performance indicators, but with no financial 
incentives attached. Defra spent £200.2 million on the food support service 
contracts up to 1 August. The service successfully delivered 4.7 million food boxes 
(paragraphs 3.8 and 3.11).
20 Local authorities have criticised the quality of early emergency bulk food 
supplies. While the doorstep food box deliveries to CEV people were being ramped 
up, Defra provided local authorities with bulk emergency food supplies for local 
distribution, as a stop-gap, where local authorities saw need. Between 27 March and 
8 April, 170 local authorities requested and received supplies costing £502,000 from 
Bidfood and Brakes, funded by Defra. Most local authorities we spoke with were 
highly critical of the quality of emergency provision. In particular, they were unhappy 
with food of poor nutritional value, seemingly random selections of provisions and 
catering-sized food and drink containers, which were impractical for individuals and 
difficult to repackage into food box portions (paragraph 3.9).
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21 Most CEV people were satisfied with the food boxes they received. Food box 
deliveries started five days after the start of shielding and went to 510,486 CEV 
people between March and 1 August. From mid-May onwards, Defra ran several 
user satisfaction surveys on the food boxes delivered to CEV people’s doors. 
These surveys found people’s satisfaction with the quality and balance of the box 
content varied between 79% and 83%. The Office for National Statistics’ (ONS) 
shielding behavioural survey (between 14 and 19 May) asked CEV people about 
the support available to help them shield at home. Of those who had not left their 
home since either being advised to shield or in the past seven days, 49% reported 
that food deliveries or food boxes helped. However, in contrast, charities and local 
authorities were critical of aspects of food boxes, the quality of fresh products and 
culturally inappropriate items. MHCLG and DHSC did not use centralised food box 
deliveries in the second lockdown, with local authorities responsible for helping 
CEV people access food (paragraphs 3.12, 4.5 and Figure 14).
22 Despite indications that the medicines delivery service worked well, NHSE&I 
had limited assurance that CEV people got their medicines as and when needed. 
DHSC commissioned NHSE&I to set up the medicines delivery service with 
pharmacies and dispensing doctors to help those who had no support from friends, 
family or volunteers. The contract with dispensing doctors and pharmacists had few 
service specifications and performance monitoring arrangements, limiting NHSE&I’s 
assurance over whether CEV people got their medicines as and when needed. 
NHSE&I considered that the service specification and item of service payment 
gave it adequate assurance. NHSE&I recorded numbers of deliveries claimed for 
by pharmacies and dispensing doctors, not numbers of requests fulfilled by the 
service. In the ONS shielding behavioural survey, between 14 and 19 May, 48% 
of CEV people who had not left their home since either being advised to shield or 
in the past seven days, reported that prescription delivery services helped them 
to shield. Age UK and Carers UK told us, based on feedback on all services in 
the Programme, the medicines delivery service worked well compared with other 
support (paragraphs 3.15 to 3.18).
23 MHCLG could not track the delivery of basic care to CEV people as it wanted 
so took assurance in other ways. MHCLG attempted to collect data from local 
authorities on basic care provision for CEV people but was unable to identify a 
workable solution acceptable to local authorities by the end of July when the 
programme ended. Local authorities reported that bringing together data on 
basic support provided by a mix of local authority and voluntary groups was 
too burdensome. In the absence of these data, MHCLG accepted that it had 
some assurance that local authorities were meeting basic needs given that local 
authorities had provided similar support for a number of years. Its engagement 
with local authorities also gave it some assurance that they were meeting basic 
needs (paragraph 3.21).
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24 MHCLG’s engagement with local authorities was initially poor but did improve. 
The five local authorities we spoke to, and representative groups such as the 
Local Government Association, noted that the government’s engagement with 
local authorities was initially poor. Some local authorities queried why government 
had chosen a centrally directed rather than a local system of support, particularly 
for food, and some felt that they would have provided better quality support than 
that provided by the Programme. From March, MHCLG discussed shielding with 
a small number of local authorities, and its regional forum of nine local authority 
chief executives, and provided guidance and direction to local authorities and their 
representatives, including the Local Government Association. However, MHCLG’s 
initial engagement was more directive rather than consultative. MHCLG recognised 
that it needed to improve engagement with local authorities and the Programme 
moved to a more collaborative approach. Early in April, it set up the fortnightly 
stakeholder engagement forum, on which nine local authority chief executives 
were represented. On 18 May, MHCLG began to email local authorities weekly 
with updates to the Programme (paragraphs 3.22 and 3.23).
Outcomes
25 Most CEV people followed guidance on shielding. The Programme aimed to 
reduce mortality and severe illness from COVID-19 by providing CEV people with 
public health guidance and support (access to food, medicine and basic care) 
to stay at home and avoid all non-essential contact. Offering this support was a 
prudent response to asking CEV people to shield. The ONS shielding behavioural 
survey found 94% of CEV people reported that, overall, they had either completely 
or mostly followed government shielding guidance. In the ONS survey (in relation 
to CEV people who had not left their home since either being advised to shield or 
in the past seven days), 82% of those who had registered as needing support, 
reported that the food boxes and food deliveries helped them to shield at home 
(paragraphs 4.2, 4.4, 4.5 and 4.8).
26 DHSC is unable to say whether shielding led to fewer deaths and less serious 
illness in CEV people than would otherwise have been the case, although it is likely 
to have helped. DHSC is confident that shielding has helped to protect CEV people. 
However, it told us that, because of methodological challenges, it has not been 
possible to reliably estimate what the mortality rates would have been if shielding 
had not been implemented. The mortality rate where COVID-19 was mentioned on 
the death certificate, remained higher for CEV people than that of the age-matched 
general population sample throughout the Programme. It was more than twice as 
high for CEV people at 13.6 per 100,000 people at its first wave peak on 9 April, 
compared with 5.3 per 100,000 people in the age-matched general population 
sample (paragraphs 4.3 and 4.6, and Figures 11 and 12).
Protecting and supporting the clinically extremely vulnerable during lockdown Summary 13 
Expenditure
27 Total expenditure on the programme up to 1 August was £308 million. 
Two-thirds of expenditure (£200.2 million) related to food box deliveries, with 
£34.3 million spent on the medicines delivery service and £18.4 million on the 
shielding contact centre. MHCLG paid £0.7 million to KPMG for programme 
management work. Local authorities estimate that they have spent £54.4 million 
on basic care and other support to CEV people. Regional variations in the numbers 
on the List created a disproportionate burden on some local authorities as 
funding allocations did not consider the numbers of people on the List, although 
funding levels for the second lockdown in November 2020 were based on local 
CEV numbers (paragraph 1.11 and Figure 4).
Shielding during the second lockdown
28 The departments involved in the Programme have applied lessons learned to 
the second lockdown (5 November to 2 December 2020). In mid-April, DHSC and 
MHCLG started to consider future options for shielding once the initial 12 weeks 
ended at the end of June. In August, following the pausing of shielding and 
increased confidence in the local availability of food, the government conducted an 
early lessons learned review of the Programme. This review followed engagement 
with local authorities, and concluded that the speed and context in which the 
Programme was developed meant that it was largely offered universally – resulting 
in poor targeting and inefficient use of funds. It noted that, should shielding 
be needed again, adopting a local support model could improve flexibility and 
potentially be more cost-effective. It is clear that departments have applied many of 
these lessons to the second iteration of shielding in November 2020. For example, 
they have introduced a new National Shielding Service System which allows CEV 
people to register their needs more easily and has been well received by those local 
authorities we spoke to (paragraphs 4.10 and 4.11, and Figure 14).
Conclusion on value for money
29 The shielding programme was a swift government-wide response to protect 
clinically extremely vulnerable people against COVID-19, pulled together at pace 
in the absence of detailed contingency plans. Government recognised the need to 
provide food, medicines and basic care to those CEV people shielding to help meet 
its objective of reducing the number of people suffering from severe illness and 
dying from COVID-19. There was impressive initial support offered to many people, 
with food provided to just over 500,000 people. Although the need to support was 
urgent, it took time for people to be identified as CEV, and therefore access formal 
support. This followed challenges extracting data from different IT systems and the 
understandable need for GPs and trusts to review the List of vulnerable people from 
their clinical perspective.
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30 DHSC is confident that shielding has helped to protect CEV people and it is 
clear that many CEV people benefited from the support the Programme provided. 
However, given the challenges in assessing the impact of shielding on CEV people’s 
health, government cannot say whether the £300 million spent on this programme 
has helped meet its central objective to reduce the level of serious illness and 
deaths from COVID-19 across CEV people. Departments have learned lessons from 
the first iteration of shielding from March to August 2020 and applied many of these 
to shielding during the second lockdown in November 2020.
Recommendations
31 To improve support to CEV people when advised to shield in the future, 
we recommend that:
a DHSC should ensure that healthcare data systems allow easy, but secure, 
access to healthcare data;
b NHSE&I and NHS Digital should set out how they will improve the accuracy 
of patient telephone numbers to improve the speed of communication 
with patients;
c DHSC should set out the core data requirements it is likely to need in a 
future pandemic or civil emergency and how it can access these data in 
a timely manner;
d DHSC should establish a robust plan on how to communicate clearly, 
quickly and consistently with CEV people to ensure that people are clear if 
they need to shield, why they need to shield, how to shield and the support 
available to them;
e By April 2021, MHCLG should review the effectiveness of the new National 
Shielding Service System, introduced for the second lockdown, to ensure 
that it provides intended benefits;
f MHCLG should set out how it can establish the capacity and capability 
of local authorities to support shielding-type exercises in a timely way in 
the event of future pandemics or civil emergencies and how it can engage 
more effectively with local authorities; and
g For future pandemic planning, government should consider how it will 
approach balancing the relative merits of central, universal offers of 
support against targeted local support.
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Part One
The shielding programme
1.1 This part of the report sets out the origin, goals and organisation of the 
shielding programme (the Programme).
The origin of the Programme
1.2 On 16 March, in response to increased cases of COVID-19, the Prime Minister 
set out a need to ensure that those with the most serious health conditions were 
largely shielded from social contact. On 22 March, the Secretary of State for 
Housing, Communities and Local Government urged people in England who faced 
the highest risk of being hospitalised by the virus to shield themselves and stay at 
home from that date.
1.3 The 22 March announcement gave more detailed guidance and information for 
shielding, including the conditions which made people clinically extremely vulnerable 
(CEV) and the support they would receive. The announcement advised CEV people 
to not leave their homes for 12 weeks from 22 March and not go out for shopping, 
travel or leisure. Initially government anticipated 1.5 million people to be classified as 
CEV, and it ultimately identified more than 2.2 million CEV people. National shielding 
advice was paused in England on 1 August, although it continued in some areas in 
local lockdown, on clinical advice from the chief medical officer. Figure 1 on pages 16 
and 17 sets out key dates in the Programme.
1.4 There was no pre-existing mechanism or organisation for identifying and 
supporting a significant population advised to shield. In 2016, the Department of 
Health & Social Care (DHSC) commissioned Public Health England to run Exercise 
Cygnus, which was designed to assess the UK’s preparedness and response to an 
influenza pandemic, and identify lessons. However, the testing of plans and policies 
for the identification and shielding of clinically extremely vulnerable people were not 
objectives of Exercise Cygnus. As a consequence, in early March 2020, government 
urgently needed to develop from scratch a new means to identify vulnerable people 
and arrange to support their needs in light of its advice to not leave their homes.
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Figure 1
Key events in the shielding programme from 5 March 2020
The national shielding programme started on 22 March 2020 and was paused on 1 August 2020
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis of documents from the Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government, Department of
Health & Social Care, Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs, NHS Digital, NHS England & NHS Improvement, Government
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Figure 1
Key events in the shielding programme from 5 March 2020
The national shielding programme started on 22 March 2020 and was paused on 1 August 2020
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis of documents from the Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government, Department of
Health & Social Care, Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs, NHS Digital, NHS England & NHS Improvement, Government
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1.5 Faced with an immediate need to ensure reliable access to food, medicines and 
care for an anticipated 1.5 million people, in March, ministers quickly commissioned 
shielding as a centrally directed programme with an offer of local support to all 
people considered CEV. Government chose a centrally directed system of support 
for CEV people led by the Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government 
(MHCLG). Government chose a centrally directed rather than local approach for 
speed and confidence in delivery. It did so because of concerns about capacity in 
local food supplies and supermarket shortages and after briefly consulting a small 
number of local authorities. Government did not attempt to systematically assess 
the capacity or willingness of local authorities to provide a more local model of 
support as a thorough assessment would have been difficult in the time available.
Objective of the Programme
1.6 The objective of the Programme was to minimise mortality and severe illness 
among those who are CEV by providing them with public health guidance and support 
to stay at home and avoid all non-essential contact. Through the Programme, 
CEV people could get support accessing food, medicine and basic care.
Roles and responsibilities
1.7 MHCLG had overall delivery responsibility for the Programme and DHSC was 
responsible for determining who should shield, evaluating the health impact of 
shielding and determining and issuing clinical advice (Figure 2). NHS Digital was 
responsible for producing the list of people who were to be advised to shield and 
working with GP systems’ suppliers on any required changes. The Department for 
Environment, Food & Rural Affairs (Defra) led on providing food to people shielding 
as it had relationships with the food industry. NHS England & NHS Improvement 
(NHSE&I) ran the medicines delivery service to get medicines to people through 
local pharmacies and enhanced support to CEV people through the NHS Volunteer 
Responder service. The Government Digital Service (GDS) was responsible for 
creating and running the digital service, which consisted of a website, an automated 
telephone helpline and other services required to collect, store and share information 
on the support needs of CEV people. The Department for Work & Pensions (DWP) 
ran a contact centre to call CEV people.
1.8 Cabinet Office suggested to MHCLG that it appoint an external senior 
responsible owner (SRO) for the Programme. Approval for this short-term 
appointment was given by the Civil Service Commission. A steering group to 
decide the Programme’s strategy was in place by 7 April (Figure 3 on page 20). 
Stakeholders across the Programme have noted that early working was energetic 
but not well joined-up, however, this improved markedly once the SRO took up 
post given his work.









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































20 Part One Protecting and supporting the clinically extremely vulnerable during lockdown 




Cabinet Office COVID-19 




1  to provide effective resolution of 
cross-department operational 
performance issues;
2  to provide effective decision-making to 
evolve end-to-end service design; and
3  to oversee effective communication 
around the Programme to stakeholders.
Representatives from:
• Cabinet Office.
• Prime Minister’s Office.
Members:
• Ministry of Housing, Communities 
& Local Government.
• Department of Health & Social Care.
• Department for Environment, Food 
& Rural Affairs.
• Department for Work & Pensions.




1  to provide effective resolution of 
delivery issues associated with 
operations, reporting, scaling and 
sustainability of the service; and
2  to escalate issues to the Programme 
steering group.
Members:
• Ministry of Housing, Communities 
& Local Government.
• Department of Health & Social Care.
• Department for Environment, Food 
& Rural Affairs.
• Department for Work & Pensions.
• Government Digital Service.
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis of Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government documentation
Figure 3
Governance and reporting in the shielding programme (the Programme) from
22 March to 1 August 2020
Key departments for the Programme were all involved in the governance arrangements
The Programme’s Senior Responsible Owner
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1.9 Before becoming the Programme’s SRO in April 2020, the individual concerned 
had accepted a position in KPMG, starting later in the year. Prior to his appointment 
as SRO, KPMG had been awarded a contract with MHCLG worth an estimated 
£1.5 million (actual spend was £0.7 million) to work on the Programme, leading 
to a concern, from the proposed SRO, as to how to avoid potential conflicts of 
interest. Before taking up post, and following his disclosure of his future post 
with KPMG, MHCLG and the incoming SRO therefore agreed to his request that, 
for any commercial arrangements in respect of shielding where the SRO might 
be needed to set the specification, they would not be involved in any selection 
or appointment process or commercial arrangements.
1.10 Local authorities were responsible for contacting difficult to reach CEV people 
and distributing emergency food supplies (paid by Defra) in the initial stages of 
shielding while national food distribution was being put in place. They were also 
responsible for providing basic care for those CEV people who requested this 
support and for arranging help and support for CEV people if a more tailored 
approach was needed, for example, if food boxes did not meet cultural or dietary 
requirements. Local authorities estimate that they spent £54.4 million on supporting 
CEV people from 1 April to 1 August. Government provided authorities with 
£3.7 billion in non-ringfenced emergency COVID-19 funding between March and 
July 2020. This included £500 million on 2 July. MHCLG also expected local 
resilience forums to have a strategic coordination function in terms of keeping 
an overall view of demand and direction of supply of support. In reality, local 
resilience forums played a minor role focused on reporting progress to MHCLG.
Expenditure
1.11 Total expenditure on the programme up to 1 August was £308 million 
(Figure 4 overleaf). The food delivery service was the highest area of expenditure 
at £200.2 million. Expenditure on the medicines delivery service was £34.3 million 
and £18.4 million on the shielding contact centre. MHCLG paid £0.7 million to KPMG 
for programme management work. Local authorities estimate that they have spent 
£54.4 million on basic care and other support to CEV people. Regional variation 
of the numbers of CEV people created a disproportionate burden on some local 
authorities to support CEV people as funding allocated to local authorities did not 
take into account the numbers of CEV people in that area. However, funding levels 
for the second lockdown in November 2020 were based on local CEV numbers.
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Element of programme Lead department Cost (£m)
Notes
1 Costs are exclusive of VAT where known.
2 We have excluded the costs of the NHS Volunteer Responders as it is not possible to disaggregate the costs 
relating to clinically extremely vulnerable (CEV) people.
3 The medicines delivery service is led by NHS England & NHS Improvement but funded by the Department of Health 
& Social Care.
4 Costs for the shielding contact centre include programme management payments to KPMG and £17.5 million cost 
of the Serco contract.
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis of documents from the Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government, 
Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs, NHS England & NHS Improvement, and Department for Work 
& Pensions
Figure 4
Costs of shielding programme (the Programme) to 1 August 2020
The costs of the Programme totalled £308 million 
Total 308.0
Department for Work 
& Pensions
Ministry of 
Housing, Communities & 
Local Government
NHS England & 
NHS Improvement
Department for 









Food box deliveries and 
emergency bulk 
food supply
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Part Two
Identifying clinically extremely vulnerable people
2.1 In this part of the report, we examine how effectively government identified and 
communicated with clinically extremely vulnerable (CEV) people.
Developing the criteria for who is most vulnerable
2.2 On 5 March and 10 March 2020, the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies 
(SAGE) discussed the need for vulnerable groups to be identified and protected 
in response to COVID-19. Following SAGE discussions, government decided to 
develop a policy to socially distance the vulnerable and elderly. The main objective 
of distancing vulnerable people was to prevent loss of life.
2.3 The four national UK chief medical officers, advised by clinical leaders, within 
two weeks, agreed the clinical criteria for who was to be advised to shield, based 
on the limited clinical evidence on the virus available at the time. The criteria for 
shielding were exclusively clinical to identify people at the highest risk of mortality 
and severe illness from COVID-19. On 18 March, the chief medical officers 
finalised the interim list of conditions (Appendix Three). The chief medical officers 
continued to consider and include new medical conditions as required. New medical 
conditions were also added when shielding was reintroduced in November 2020. 
Protected characteristics were considered at the start, and throughout the shielding 
programme (the Programme) and were dealt with as the the chief medical officers 
considered to be clinically appropriate:
• to develop the criteria of who was CEV, the UK chief medical officers drew up a 
list of medical conditions which they considered could make people more at risk 
from severe illness of mortality from COVID-19, based on the clinical evidence 
at the time;
• age was not an individual criterion for inclusion in the CEV group, but all people 
aged 70 and over were advised to take extra precautions as part of the group 
considered clinically vulnerable;1 and
• potential risks associated with ethnicity were considered in detail but the clinical 
criteria used to determine if someone was CEV already covered those clinical 
conditions more prevalent across ethnic minority groups. At this time, ethnicity 
risks could not be differentiated from other non-clinical factors such as occupation.
1 People considered ‘clinically vulnerable’ were those at moderate risk from COVID-19 and includes people over the 
age of 70 or people who are very obese.
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Developing the shielded patient list
2.4 At the start of the pandemic, there was no mechanism to allow a fast ‘sweep’ 
across all patients to identify, in real time, those who fell within a defined clinical 
category. The Department for Health & Social Care (DHSC) tasked NHS Digital to 
use existing patient data to identify people who were CEV. It shared the list of criteria 
with NHS Digital on 18 March. NHS Digital applied the list of criteria to medical 
codes, to identify patients from several existing datasets: hospital data; GP patient 
data; prescribed medicines data; and maternity data (Figure 5). From this, NHS 
Digital compiled the shielded patient list (the List).
2.5 NHS Digital developed the List in several iterations, as more data became 
available. The first iteration, based on hospital, maternity and prescribed medicines 
data, was ready on 20 March and included some 870,000 people. The second 
iteration, using GP patient data added 420,000 people, and was not released 
until 12 April owing to the time needed to extract these data as NHS Digital did 
not have ready access to this dataset. Some 1.3 million CEV people were on 
the List by 12 April. These people were sent letters advising them to shield and 
of their eligibility for support, for which they needed to register. The time taken 
to identify all CEV people from when the criteria for CEV people were agreed 
on 18 March was largely down to the challenge of extracting usable data from 
different NHS and GP IT systems.
2.6 As part of the agreed clinical decision making process set out by the UK chief 
medical officers, on 9 April NHS England & NHS Improvement (NHSE&I) asked 
GPs and NHS trusts and NHS foundation trusts (trusts) to review the List and add 
or remove people based on their clinical judgement, local patient records, and 
as individuals’ medical conditions changed. Once changes had been made to IT 
systems to make the data available to GPs and trusts to review, they responded 
quickly. As a result, the List continued to increase and the Programme started to 
add a further 900,000 people to the List between 18 April and 7 May making them 
formally eligible for the central support offered through the Programme. There were 
1.8 million people on the List by 18 April and the List stabilised at 2.2 million CEV 
people by 7 May (Figure 6 on page 26). Some of this increase of 900,000 people 
will also have been due to new diagnoses and other conditions being added to the 
criteria, for example, dialysis.
2.7 People would not have been formally eligible for the central support of food 
boxes and medicines provided by the Programme until they were on the List but 
would have been able to ask their local authority for help. They would have been 
eligible for statutory sick pay given the changes made to the regulations in March 
to ensure people advised to shield could claim statutory sick pay if they were not 
able to work from home and were otherwise eligible. People identified by trusts and 
GPs should have been advised to shield by their GP or trusts as soon as they were 
considered CEV.
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National data  867,789  1,285,428  1,361,285  1,347,277  1,353,473  1,350,778 
Net GP additions 0 0  260,871  507,916  536,311  551,904 
Net NHS trusts and NHS 
foundation trusts additions
0 0  220,417  303,413  318,142  321,162 
Total  867,789  1,285,428  1,842,573  2,158,606  2,207,926  2,223,844 
Notes
1 National data include: Hospital Episode Statistics data, GP patient data, Primary Care Prescribed Medicines data, and Maternity Services
data set. This also includes deceased patients who were removed from the List. 
2 Net NHS trusts and NHS foundation trusts additions is the total of people added and removed from the List by NHS trusts and NHS foundation trusts.
3 Net GP additions is the total of people added and removed from the List by GPs.
4 The List developed over several iterations, the dates above are for each iteration of the List from 20 March to 15 May.
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis of NHS Digital data
Figure 6
Identifi cation of people on the shielded patient list (the List) from 20 March 2020






20 March 12 April 18 April 1 May 7 May 15 May
0
Number of people on the List
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2.8 Because of the nature of the data, the process and the need to act quickly, 
(Figure 5), several problems arose:
• The speed at which the List was developed (two days) meant NHS Digital relied 
on hospital, maternity and prescribed medicines data for the first iteration. 
Hospital data, while immediately available, were seven weeks out of date.
• Limitations with hospital data led to 30,000 people who had died before 
20 March being sent a letter advising them to shield.
• Hospital data did not always specify sufficient detail of people’s medical 
conditions, leading to 126,000 people being added to the List and 
unnecessarily advised to shield.
• A lack of joined-up data systems meant it took NHS Digital three weeks to 
undertake the technical task of accessing and extracting GP patient data, 
which were more specific about people’s medical conditions.
• GPs reported that the need for them to review, add and remove people from 
the List created a burden on already stretched services.
• Variations in practice locally. For example, in line with guidance available at 
the time, the Clinical Commissioning Group in Liverpool added some 37,000 
people to the List, increasing it to nearly 50,000 people – approximately 
10% of the city’s population, who became formally eligible for support under 
the Programme.
• Inaccurate or missing personal information in NHS patient records (such as 
telephone numbers) caused problems when trying to contact people on 
the List (see paragraph 3.24).
Variation
2.9 The proportion of people on the List varied locally (Figure 7 overleaf), from 
24 people per 1,000 in Oxford, to 95 people per 1,000 in Liverpool (as of 15 May 
2020). Potential contributory factors include higher proportions of elderly people 
or people with underlying health conditions, health inequalities, or differences in the 
way local healthcare providers added to or removed people from the List. The extent 
to which the List grew varied at local level (Figure 8 on page 29). For example, 
between 12 April and 15 May increases in the List at local level ranged from 15% in 
Carlisle to 352% in Hounslow. NHSE&I was not responsible for managing any local 
variations and did not challenge local clinical decisions.
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Figure 7
Number of people on the shielded patient list (the List) in England, by local 
authority districts, per 1,000 population at 15 May 2020
Regional variation exists throughout England in the number of people on the List 
Notes
1 NHS Digital combined some local authorities to create larger areas: Cornwall and Isles of Scilly were merged 
and so were Hackney and the City of London. This is refl ected on the map.
2 This map uses the old districts of Aylesbury Vale, Chiltern, South Bucks, and Wycombe for Buckinghamshire 
as this is what was used for Coronavirus Shielded Patient List Summary Totals, England as at 15 May 2020.
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis of NHS Digital data, Coronavirus Shielded Patient List Summary Totals,
England – as at 15 May 2020 and Offi ce for National Statistics, Mid-2019 estimate of the population for the UK, 
England (using April 2019 Local Authority District Codes) 
Number of people on the 
shielded patient list per 
1,000 population (number 
of local authorities)
44 and over (63)
39.0 – 43.9 (70)
34.0 – 38.9 (78)
29.0 – 33.9 (76)
Less than 29.0 (28)
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Communicating with CEV people
2.10 NHSE&I and DHSC were responsible for initially informing people that they 
were considered to be clinically extremely vulnerable to COVID-19. NHSE&I used 
Capita and the NHS Business Service Authority to send letters and text messages 
to people on the List. GPs were responsible for informing CEV people that they 
were added to or removed from the List. NHSE&I did not track this communication.
2.11 The iterative development of the List caused confusion as people struggled 
to understand why they received a letter advising them to shield, or why they were 
told they no longer needed to shield as late as June and July. Further confusion 
was caused by inconsistencies in the process by which NHSE&I and DHSC 
communicated with CEV people. For example, in May 235,000 people were added 
to the List and received a letter advising them to shield, but their GPs were not 
informed at the same time. While GPs received general guidance on shielding and 
were aware that people were being added to the List, they were not necessarily 
ready to advise these individual patients.
2.12 Government’s communications with CEV people were not always clear. 
Government had to communicate clearly, but quickly, with some 2.2 million people. 
Charities we spoke to criticised government’s communication with CEV people. They 
noted issues with a lack of transparency on why some conditions were considered 
to make people CEV, which caused confusion and uncertainty. Charities also told 
us that national communications were not always consistent with guidance and had 
confused people, and left some people unsure as to whether they needed to shield.
2.13 Charities played an important role in advising concerned people. DHSC 
engaged with charities through various forums such as focus groups. However, 
charities reported difficulties in getting detailed evidence and information from 
government. Charities also noted inconsistencies with media reports, ministerial 
comments and official guidance. For example, in mid-March some media outlets 
reported, incorrectly, that people aged over 70 would be asked to shield. On 28 May, 
nearly 50 charities wrote an open letter to the minister for the Cabinet Office asking 
for clear communications with charities, health and care professionals, and local 
authorities to ensure consistency of advice given to those who were vulnerable.
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Part Three
Supporting clinically extremely vulnerable people
3.1 This part of the report assesses the effectiveness of the support provided: 
food, medicines and basic care.
Registering support needs
3.2 Government worked rapidly to create a range of ways that clinically extremely 
vulnerable (CEV) people could register for the support they may need while shielding. 
Government wanted all CEV people to register, whether they needed help or not. 
On 20 March 2020, the Government Digital Service (GDS) was tasked to develop a 
digital service which consisted of a website, an automated telephone helpline and 
other services required to collect, store and share information on the support needs 
of CEV people. This service was operational by 23 March. Government provided 
details of how to access the website and helpline in the letters it began sending out 
to CEV people from 23 March.
3.3 When the website was first operational, people who were not on the shielded 
patient list (the List) could ‘self-declare’ that they needed support and register on 
the website. Initially, wording on the website was not clear that only people who 
met the criteria as CEV were eligible for this form of support. The wording was 
updated within six days to clarify who was eligible but by this time, some 277,000 
people had self-declared. Where possible, NHS Digital gave GPs the contact details 
of their patients who had self-declared before this clarification but were not on 
the List, for GPs to check if they needed to be added. The Ministry of Housing, 
Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) decided to honour their requests 
for support until it could be established whether or not they met the clinical criteria 
as CEV. It is likely that some people who self-declared at this time did not get their 
CEV status confirmed. A number of people continued to receive support even 
though not eligible, but the data do not capture how many. People who subsequently 
‘self-declared’ as CEV on the website but were not on the List were advised to 
contact their GP or clinician who would consider if they were CEV.
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Contact centre
3.4 Government also commissioned a contact centre through the Department for 
Work & Pensions (DWP) to call CEV people who had not yet registered through the 
website or the automated helpline as directed in the letters, to register them on their 
behalf (Figure 9). The contact centre also administered surveys and information 
campaigns on behalf of the shielding programme (the Programme). DWP appointed 
Serco to provide the contact centre under emergency procurement procedures. 
Running the contact centre cost a total of £18.4 million to 1 August 2020 (of which 
£17.5 million was paid to Serco).2 Details of the contact centre contract are in 
Appendix Four.
3.5 The contact centre started making calls on 28 March. Higher than expected 
numbers of CEV people and lower than expected website and helpline registrations 
increased demand on the service. Around 1.8 million CEV people were referred 
to the contact centre because they had not registered using the website and 
automated helpline.
3.6 By 23 June the contact centre had attempted to contact 1.8 million CEV people 
compared with initial expectations of 750,000. It was unable to register 815,000 CEV 
people. Around 375,000 of these 815,000 people could not be reached because of 
missing or inaccurate telephone numbers within NHS patient records (Figure 10 on 
page 34). While it was known to all parties that a proportion of telephone numbers 
in NHS records were missing or inaccurate, the Programme agreed to use telephone 
numbers from NHS records as a starting point to follow-up hard-copy letters. A further 
440,000 declined to register for support when contacted, for example, they hung up 
or believed it was a nuisance call. To ensure these 815,000 people did not slip through 
the net, from 28 April, GDS shared with local authorities the contact details of people 
that could not be reached, so local authorities could check if these people needed 
help (see paragraph 3.24).
2 The £18.4 million also includes programme management payments to KPMG.
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CEV individual receives a letter from government outlining how to register their support needs
CEV individual registers their requests for support on the Government Digital Service (GDS) website 
or automated helpline
This information is logged onto the GDS database
GDS shares information on CEV support needs with
Government departments
Data on CEV 
individuals who 
have not logged 
their support needs 
are passed to the 
Department for Work 
& Pensions (DWP) 
contact centre
DWP contact centre 
telephones these 
individuals to identify 
their support needs
Data are shared 





1 The food service suppliers are Brakes and Bidfood.
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis of documents from the Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government, Government Digital Service,
and Department for Work & Pensions
Local authorities
Data are shared to inform 
local authorities about 
the support needs of CEV 
people in their area
Service providers
Contact details and 
service requirements 
for support delivery










Routes for registering clinically extremely vulnerable (CEV) people’s needs during the 
shielding programme
There was a process to help ensure all CEV people were contacted and their needs registered
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Notes
1 The 1,227,874 CEV people registered whether they required support or not, excludes CEV people who had de registered before 3 August 2020.
2 The data in this fi gure exclude self-declared people who may have received support but did not get their CEV status confi rmed (paragraph 3.3).
It is unclear if the data from the contact centre include self-declared people.
3 The List stabilised at 7 May at 2,207,926 people; 2.658 million were identifi ed in total, but some of these died or were subsequently removed from the List.
4 Government Digital Service collected data on registrations to 3 August 2020.
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis of Department for Work & Pensions and Government Digital Service data
Figure 10
Number of clinically extremely vulnerable (CEV) people requesting support from 23 March 
to 3 August 2020
There were some 2.2 million people on the shielded patient list (the List); of these, 510,486 CEV people successfully received 
at least one food box
Department for Work & Pensions (DWP) 
contact centre was unable to contact 
around 815,000 CEV people; these people’s 
details were passed to local authorities.
DWP also passed the contact details of 
12,353 CEV people to local authorities for 
urgent support.
511,596 CEV people 
requested food.
138,855 CEV people 
requested basic care support.
Of these people, 118,145 
requested both food and care.
people on the List 
2.2 million
CEV people requested support
532,306
CEV people registered whether 
they required support or not
1,227,874
CEV people successfully 
received at least 
one food package
510,486
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Providing food support
Direct food support for CEV people
3.7 Government worked quickly to design a food support service and identify 
suppliers who could deliver it. The Department for Environment, Food & Rural 
Affairs (Defra) consulted widely with industry from mid-March and considered a 
range of options including supermarkets with delivery services and food wholesalers 
with distribution networks. Defra told us that industry engagement revealed that 
supermarkets were not able to meet anticipated demand in the time required, and 
Defra’s assessment was that only two wholesalers – Bidfood and Brakes – had the 
capability to source, pack and deliver the food supplies required. By 24 March, Defra 
was negotiating with Bidfood and Brakes for doorstep food box deliveries, preceded 
by emergency bulk food supplies for local authorities to distribute while food box 
deliveries were set up.
3.8 Defra negotiated contracts under emergency procurement procedures, and 
secured some reductions on initial prices. Defra signed provisional arrangements 
three days after starting negotiations, with the first deliveries starting on 27 March. 
Three further provisional arrangements were signed over the following weeks before 
Defra and the providers signed full contracts on 23 April. Over this period Defra 
used information from cost benchmarks and industry consultants to negotiate 
price reductions compared with the initial pricing quoted by the providers. In return, 
Defra gave providers increased notice for contract termination and took on more 
of the financial risk involved in providers maintaining sufficient stock levels to meet 
uncertain demand. The contracts included key performance indicators, but with no 
financial incentives attached. Details of the contracts are in Appendix Four.
Emergency bulk food supplies
3.9 Bulk supplies were not intended to mirror the content of the subsequent food 
box deliveries, instead they were to help local authorities meet basic needs, as a 
stop-gap, before food box deliveries were set up. Local authorities were told bulk 
supplies would be based on what was available to suppliers at that point. Between 
27 March and 8 April, around 170 local authorities requested and received supplies 
costing £502,000 from Bidfood and Brakes, funded by Defra. Local authorities have 
criticised the quality of provision, in particular:
• food of poor nutritional value;
• seemingly random selections of provisions; and
• catering-sized food and drink containers which were impractical for individuals 
and difficult to repackage into food box portions.
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Food box deliveries
3.10 Government designed a food box intended to provide sufficient nutrition for 
a CEV person for seven days. Defra consulted food charities and Public Health 
England nutritionists on content, developing a ‘basket’ of goods Bidfood and 
Brakes were expected to supply, along with approved substitutions should key items 
not be available. For cost and simplicity, government chose to provide a standard 
food box. Government required local authorities to provide support for people whose 
needs were not met by the standard box, for example, to meet religious, dietary or 
cultural requirements. Bidfood and Brakes were required to deliver food boxes to 
recipients’ front doors.
3.11 Uptake of food box deliveries was not as widespread as expected. Defra forecast 
that demand for food support from the initially anticipated 1.5 million CEV people 
would equate to 440,000 food boxes a week. However, while the List grew to 
2.2 million people, successful food box deliveries never exceeded a peak of 367,000 
on the week commencing 4 May 2020. Between 27 March and 1 August, Brakes 
and Bidfood successfully delivered 4.7 million food boxes.3 Nearly 172,000 boxes 
went undelivered, mostly because people rejected the delivery as no longer needed. 
Defra only paid the delivery charge for these undelivered boxes, not the cost of the 
food box itself. Defra paid Bidfood and Brakes £200.2 million for food boxes and 
emergency bulk supplies.
3.12 User satisfaction with food box deliveries was positive. Food boxes went to 
510,486 CEV people between March and 1 August. Across Defra’s user surveys 
(which ran from mid-May), satisfaction with the quality and balance of the box 
content varied between 83% and 79%. People reported fresh produce was usable 
for three days at least 83% of the time. However, charities and local authorities were 
critical of aspects of the service, reporting:
• poor quality of fresh produce in the box, often affected by hot weather;
• culturally inappropriate pork products (although Defra never intended food
boxes to be culturally appropriate);
• high reliance on tomato-based content, inappropriate for kidney patients;
• limited variety and range of meals;
• lack of non-food essentials; and
• lack of feedback mechanisms to food box providers, meaning local authorities
were fielding complaints relating to a service over which they had no control.
3 This includes 466,000 deliveries to self-declared people whose CEV status had not been confirmed.
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3.13 Many CEV people who had tried to deregister from food box deliveries 
continued to receive unwanted boxes. Defra reported the problem to GDS in late 
April. Due to competing demands, the Programme prioritised other requirements and 
GDS did not address the issue until mid-May. Defra, GDS and the providers initially 
implemented a manual solution to remove deregistered people from future deliveries 
and then introduced an ‘opt out’ function although problems persisted until the end 
of July. Defra estimated that 90,000 food boxes were delivered to people who had 
tried and failed to deregister, at an avoidable cost of £4.1 million.4
Supermarket priority deliveries
3.14 Defra also engaged with the supermarket sector to increase the number of 
priority supermarket deliveries to CEV people. Where CEV people indicated on 
registering that they did not have a way of getting essential supplies delivered, 
their details were passed to the seven participating supermarkets in line with data 
sharing agreements. Where CEV people had online accounts with one or more 
supermarkets, their data were matched and they were provided with priority access 
to delivery slots. As the availability of supermarket delivery slots increased, from 
mid-May, government began encouraging people to move off the food box deliveries, 
with limited success. In the week commencing 27 July, there were 220,000 
successful food box deliveries.
Medicines delivery service
3.15 On 9 March, government tasked DHSC to develop a service to ensure that CEV 
people could access their medicines while shielding. This was to help those who had 
no support from friends, family or volunteers. DHSC worked with NHS England & 
NHS Improvement (NHSE&I) to design a suitable service with pharmacy providers. 
This process took four weeks; as a result, the medicines delivery service was not 
commissioned to start until 9 April.
3.16 Under the service, pharmacies and dispensing doctors were responsible, and 
paid, for ensuring that CEV people got medicines.5 The preference was for CEV people 
to ask family and friends or NHS Volunteer Responders to deliver their medicines, 
with pharmacies and dispensing doctors making deliveries when volunteers were not 
available. NHSE&I informed CEV people of the service using the letters that advised 
them to shield and the support available to them (see paragraph 2.10).
4 Defra considered that in addition to these 90,000 food boxes, there were approximately a further 60,000 food 
boxes unavoidably delivered to people who had tried to deregister, for example, as they tried to deregister too close 
to the delivery date.
5 The legal framework for the service was provided by the National Health Service (Amendments Relating to 
the Provision of Primary Care Services During a pandemic etc.) Regulations 2020 which came into effect on 
27 March 2020.
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3.17 As of the end of July, the total number of deliveries was 2,436,289. Not all CEV 
people used the medicines delivery service. Some would have asked family and friends 
or NHS Volunteer Responders to deliver their medicines, although some CEV people 
reported leaving home to collect their own medicines (Figure 13). However, in Office for 
National Statistics (ONS) shielding behavioural survey (between 14 and 19 May), 48% 
of CEV people who had not left their home since either being advised to shield or in 
the past seven days reported that prescription delivery services helped them shield 
at home.6 Age UK and Carers UK told us, based on feedback on all services in the 
Programme, the medicines delivery service worked well compared with other support.
3.18 Expenditure was £34.3 million at the end of July. NHSE&I had a system to 
assure payment claims from pharmacies and dispensing doctors; however, we 
have not validated or audited this process. The contract with dispensing doctors 
and pharmacists had few service specifications and performance monitoring 
arrangements, limiting NHSE&I’s assurance over whether CEV people got their 
medicines as and when needed. NHSE&I considered that the service specification 
and item of service payment gave it adequate assurance. NHSE&I recorded 
numbers of deliveries claimed for by pharmacies and dispensing doctors, not 
numbers of requests fulfilled by the service. Because monitoring was based on 
monthly payment data, NHSE&I did not start getting information about how many 
deliveries CEV people got through the medicines delivery service until 10 May. 
NHSE&I considers that positive feedback as well as no complaints indicates that 
the medicines delivery service was working well.
Basic care support
3.19 Government identified that shielding could create challenges for CEV people 
who relied on informal support from friends and family which became unavailable 
due to lockdown restrictions and shielding guidance, and some would need 
additional support to help them follow shielding guidance. In those cases, CEV 
people could register basic care needs through the website, automated helpline 
or contact centre registration process; 139,000 CEV people registered for care 
support through national systems over the course of the Programme. Government 
asked local authorities to provide basic care. GDS provided data to local authorities 
on people who requested support as well as people who the contact centre had 
not been able to contact. The term ‘basic care’ caused some confusion as many 
local authorities are required to provide social care which has a statutory definition, 
whereas ‘basic care’ was open to interpretation. Local authorities had discretion 
over the delivery of basic care.
6 Surveys ran between 14 May and 16 July. The survey was co-produced by DHSC, DWP, GDS and the Office for 
National Statistics. There were five surveys conducted in total, we have chosen to use data from one survey 
conducted between 14 and 19 May. The survey for 14 to 19 May was based on a sample of 4,224 CEV people, 
although response rates to individual questions varied. ONS weighted the survey to be reflective of the whole CEV 
population: www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/healthandsocialcare/conditionsanddiseases/datasets/
coronavirusandshieldingofclinicallyextremelyvulnerablepeopleinengland
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3.20 Local authorities could use NHS Volunteer Responders to help meet people’s 
basic needs, although uptake varied across local authorities. Local authorities also 
used local voluntary groups (including charities, faith groups and so on) to help meet 
the basic needs of CEV people, and other vulnerable people. Examples include:
• in Devon, councils worked with local football teams and sports coaches who 
helped with food and medicines delivery; and
• Brent Council provided financial support to eight voluntary organisations it 
worked with to help with supporting vulnerable people, including CEV people.
3.21 MHCLG was not able to track local delivery of basic care support to CEV 
people. MHCLG attempted to collect data from local authorities on basic care 
provision but was unable to identify a workable solution that was acceptable to 
local authorities by the end of July when the Programme ended. Local authorities 
reported that bringing together data on basic support provided by a mix of local 
authority and voluntary groups was too burdensome. In the absence of these data, 
MHCLG accepted that it had some assurance that local authorities were meeting 
basic needs given that local authorities had provided similar support for a number 
of years. Its engagement with local authorities also gave it some assurance that 
they were meeting basic needs.
Local and central engagement
3.22 The five local authorities we spoke to, and representative groups such as 
the Local Government Association, noted that the government’s engagement with 
local authorities was initially poor. Some local authorities queried why government 
had chosen a centrally directed rather than a local system of support, particularly 
for food, and some felt that they would have provided better quality support than 
that provided by the Programme. From March, MHCLG discussed shielding with 
a small number of local authorities, and its regional forum of nine local authority 
chief executives; and provided guidance and direction to local authorities and their 
representatives, including the Local Government Association. However, MHCLG’s 
initial engagement was more directive rather than consultative. The small number 
of local authorities we have spoken to have criticised government’s engagement 
with them in the first few weeks of the Programme, with some noting that 
engagement improved over summer.
3.23 MHCLG recognised that it needed to improve engagement with local authorities 
and moved to a more collaborative approach. Early in April, it set up the fortnightly 
stakeholder engagement forum, on which nine local authority chief executives 
were represented. The first meeting was held on 8 April. On 18 May, MHCLG began 
to email local authorities weekly with updates to the Programme. It also provided 
dedicated contact points with each local authority. At the end of June, MHCLG set 
up two ‘task and finish’ groups with local authorities and government to support 
future shielding.
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Data
3.24 In addition to the clinical shortcomings of the data used to create the List 
(paragraph 2.8), other shortcomings with data have affected the efficiency and 
effectiveness of several aspects of the Programme:
• Missing or inaccurate telephone numbers in the data used to create the
List caused problems when trying to contact CEV people. The contact
centre was unable to call around 375,000 CEV people as telephone numbers
provided in NHS patient records were missing or inaccurate. Local authorities
also struggled with inaccurate contact data for CEV people which created
additional work for them in cleansing these data and potentially delayed
getting support to CEV people.
• No system for feedback – the system did not allow local authorities to return
corrected data back to NHS Digital or GDS, so inaccuracies continued.
• Multiple lists – local authorities also told us that they received different ‘lists’
of CEV people which needed reconciling. Local authorities received the
shielded patient list, people who had registered online, and food deliveries
made. Local authorities did not receive data on CEV people who the contact
centre could not contact until 28 April. This meant that local authorities
struggled to check if all CEV people’s needs were being met.
Sharing data on support needs
3.25 Government faced a complex challenge sharing registration data with those 
who needed it. GDS was responsible for the service that registered and stored CEV 
peoples’ support needs, initially using data from the List. At peak, around 60 staff 
were involved in delivering the service. These data needed to be shared securely 
with other government departments, local authorities and food providers.
3.26 The highly sensitive personal data involved, required GDS to agree data 
sharing agreements across different bodies so it could meet the needs of CEV 
people. Government’s need for swift and secure sharing of data required GDS 
to make compromises in the design of data storage and sharing approaches. 
Government needed to share data as soon as it was able, to quickly meet 
the needs of CEV people. GDS accepted that the quality of the data could be 
compromised, meaning that organisations receiving the data would have to 
cleanse some of these data. Legal restrictions meant GDS had to prioritise 
security of the dataset over usability. GDS sought to minimise the risk of data 
loss through restricting users’ ability to access, review and update their information. 
As a result, CEV people could not have potentially vulnerable password access to 
the dataset to update their own details. If people needed to update their support 
needs, the design of the system meant that they had to reregister from scratch. 
Charities reported many CEV people struggled with this reregistration. It also 
resulted in duplicate records and further quality issues.
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Part Four
Outcomes and lessons learned
4.1 This section of the report looks at outcomes for clinically extremely vulnerable 
(CEV) people and whether the Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local 
Government (MHCLG) and other departments have learned and applied lessons to 
the second lockdown.
Outcomes
4.2 The key aim of the shielding programme (the Programme) was to reduce 
mortality and severe illness from COVID-19 in CEV people by providing them with 
public health guidance and support to stay at home and avoid all non-essential 
contact. Offering this support was a prudent response to asking CEV people to shield.
4.3 Disentangling the impact of shielding from other factors, such as the lockdown 
and individual behaviours, is extremely difficult. Other interventions, such as the 
national lockdown, took effect at the same time, and there was no control group of 
similarly at-risk individuals who were not asked to shield. The Department of Health 
& Social Care (DHSC) is confident that shielding has helped to protect CEV people. 
However, it told us that, because of methodological challenges, it has not been 
possible to reliably estimate what the mortality rates would have been if shielding 
had not been implemented. While DHSC and MHCLG can say how many people 
received elements of support, such as food boxes, they cannot determine whether 
providing that support ultimately reduced mortality and severe illness in CEV people.
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4.4 The Office for National Statistics’ (ONS) shielding behavioural survey ran 
from 14 May to 16 July and examined the behaviours of people shielding.7 The 
ONS survey suggested that some CEV people experienced worsening mental and 
physical health since being advised to shield. In the survey, CEV people reported:
• 20% were no longer accessing certain types of care (for example tests,
scans); and
• 36% reported worsening mental health and well-being.8
4.5 The ONS survey asked CEV people, whether they had registered for support 
or not, if they found the support provided by the Programme had helped them shield 
at home. In relation to CEV people who had not left their home since either being 
advised to shield or in the past seven days, 82% of those who had registered as 
needing support reported that the food boxes and food deliveries helped them to 
shield at home. Overall, CEV people - whether they had or had not registered for 
support - reported that prescription delivery services, or having someone else to 
collect medicine and food deliveries or food boxes were the most useful elements. 
Of those who had not left their home since either being advised to shield or in the 
past seven days:9
• 49% reported that food deliveries or food boxes helped;
• 48% reported that prescription delivery services helped; and
• 9% reported that personal care at home helped.
4.6 DHSC and NHS Digital monitored overall mortality, mortality involving 
COVID-19 and emergency admissions for the majority of people who were on the 
shielded patient list (the List).10 Some 7,130 CEV people died with COVID-19 on 
their death certificate, compared with 42,670 from non-COVID-19 causes between 
23 March and 31 August 2020. NHS Digital data on healthcare outcomes for CEV 
people,11 compared with an age-matched sample of the general population between 
23 March and 31 August 2020, showed that: 
7 Between 14 May and 16 July, the survey was conducted five times, approximately every two to three weeks. We 
have chosen to use data from one survey conducted from 14 to 19 May to avoid reporting behaviour that occurred 
after shielding guidance changed. The original guidance advised people to stay at home at all times. This changed 
on 1 June to advise CEV people that they could leave home once a day into open space, as long as they could keep 
two metres from others not shielding alongside them. The guidance was updated on 6 July to advise CEV people 
that they could leave their homes and be in open spaces with others. The survey for 14 to 19 May was based on a 
sample of 4,224 CEV people, although response rates to individual questions varied. ONS weighted the survey to 
be reflective of the whole CEV population: www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/healthandsocialcare/
conditionsanddiseases/datasets/coronavirusandshieldingofclinicallyextremelyvulnerablepeopleinengland
8 ONS report on Coronavirus and anxiety (June 2020) found 37% of respondents were reporting high levels of 
anxiety in the general population between 30 April and 10 May 2020.
9 The data relates to all CEV people surveyed, whether they had registered for support or not.
10 DHSC and NHS Digital only monitored outcomes for some 1.6 million people who were on the List as of 18 April. 
It is unclear why they did not monitor outcomes for people added to the List after this date.
11 All references to the general population refer to the age-matched sample of the general population used by NHS Digital.
Protecting and supporting the clinically extremely vulnerable during lockdown Part Four 43 
• the overall mortality rate for CEV people remained higher than that of the 
general population and was nearly three times higher (39.5 per 100,000) at its 
peak on 2 April than the first wave peak for the general population (14.3 per 
100,000) on 12 April;12
• the mortality rate where COVID-19 was mentioned on the death certificate 
was more than twice as high for CEV people at 13.6 per 100,000 at its first 
wave peak on 9 April,13 compared with 5.3 per 100,000 people in the general 
population on the same date (Figure 11 overleaf); and 
• emergency admission rates before and during COVID-19 were higher for CEV 
people than the general population. While emergency admissions decreased 
for everyone in March, they decreased more for CEV people (46% decrease) 
compared with the general population (33% decrease) by mid-April and, unlike 
for the general population, have not subsequently recovered (Figure 12 on 
page 45).
4.7 CEV people live in a number of settings including care homes. Care homes 
were not given detailed guidance on how to help their residents to shield. Instead, 
DHSC intended that their care would be covered by the general COVID-19 guidance 
provided to care homes. Analysis shows that approximately 45,000 of the 2.2 million 
CEV people were care home residents. Of those, some 3,889 (8.6% of CEV people 
in care homes) died and had COVID-19 recorded on their death certificate as at 
7 December. We do not have comparable data for non-CEV people in care homes.
Following CEV guidance
4.8 The ONS shielding behavioural survey between 14 and 19 May, found that 
94% of CEV people reported that, overall, they had either completely or mostly 
followed government shielding guidance. However, behaviour reported elsewhere in 
the survey suggests fewer people followed the guidance completely. For example, 
of the 49% of CEV people who reported that they had left their home or garden 
since the start of shielding, 85% of these had done so in the previous seven days. 
The most common reason CEV people had left home in the previous seven days was 
for exercise, followed by shopping for essentials and GP or hospital appointments 
(Figure 13 on page 46). This behaviour is not wholly compatible with the guidance 
which advised people to not leave their homes except if they needed to see their GP 
in person or attend planned hospital appointments.
12 NHS Digital measured mortality rates using a seven-day rolling average.
13 Mortality also peaked to this level on 7 April.
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Figure 13
Reasons why clinically extremely vulnerable (CEV) people reported leaving 
their home or garden, 14 to 19 May 2020 
Between 14 and 19 May, of the CEV people who said that they had left their homes and gardens in the 
past seven days, 51% reported it was for exercise and 27% reported it was to shop for essentials
Notes
1 From 14 May to 16 July the survey was conducted five times, approximately every two to three weeks. We have 
chosen to use data from one survey conducted between 14 May and 19 May to avoid reporting behaviour that 
occurred after shielding guidance changed.
2 The base population for the percentages is those who left their home or garden since receiving shielding 
guidance – 49% of people who responded.
Source: National Audit Office analysis of Office for National Statistics Shielding Behavioural Survey data
Percentage of respondents (%)
Reason reported for leaving home or garden
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Ending support
4.9 Some 220,000 people were still receiving food boxes in the final week of 
the Programme at the end of July 2020. CEV people were still eligible for priority 
supermarket slots if they had registered before 18 July. The Department for 
Environment, Food & Rural Affairs’ (Defra’s) original contract with Bidfood and 
Brakes ran to 3 July, and on 4 June Defra signed an extension to continue provision 
to 3 September. Within three weeks of agreeing the extension, Defra had to serve 
a termination notice giving rise to contractual termination costs of £3.8 million, 
although Defra negotiated this down from a potential £6.9 million. NHS England & 
NHS Improvement (NHSE&I) continued to commission the medicines delivery service 
as needed to support local lockdowns. Following the pausing of shielding nationally, 
CEV people in local outbreak areas were advised to continue shielding and were 
able to have their medicines delivered to them and access support from local 
authorities. Local authorities were no longer expected to meet CEV people’s basic 
care needs and were encouraged to make use of local community groups and the 
NHS Volunteer Responders, who continued to provide help.
Lessons learned and the second lockdown
4.10 It is evident that the departments involved in the Programme actively considered 
lessons learned which they applied to shielding during the second lockdown from 
5 November to 2 December 2020. In mid-April, DHSC and MHCLG started to consider 
future options for shielding once the initial 12 weeks ended at the end of June. 
In August, following the pausing of shielding and increased confidence in the local 
availability of food, the government conducted an early lessons learned review of the 
Programme. Following engagement with local authorities, the review concluded that the 
speed and context in which the Programme was developed meant that it was largely 
offered universally – resulting in poor targeting and inefficient use of funds. It noted 
that, should shielding be needed again, adopting a local support model could improve 
flexibility and potentially be more cost-effective. MHCLG has also conducted a formal 
lessons learned exercise, which focused on the support element, not the identification 
of, or communication with CEV people. The departments involved in the Programme 
have all contributed. This exercise was finalised in December, four months after 
shielding was paused and after the second lockdown.
4.11 It is clear that the departments have still applied many of these lessons to 
this second iteration of shielding. For example, MHCLG introduced a new national 
shielding service system, which allows CEV people to register their needs more 
easily. This has been well received by the local authorities with whom we spoke 
(Figure 14 on pages 48 and 49).
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Figure 14
Lessons learned and applied in second lockdown, November 2020
The departments have considered and applied many lessons to the second lockdown
Features Phase one of shielding
(22 March – 1 August 2020)
Developments and lessons learned Lockdown two
(5 November – 2 December 2020)
Identifying clinically 
extremely vulnerable 
(CEV) people and 
creating the shielded 
patient list (the List)
The criteria were based on 
clinical understanding and 
agreed by the chief medical 
officers (Appendix Three).
The Department of Health & Social 
Care (DHSC) is working to apply 
the predictive risk model to enable 
a more sophisticated approach to 
clinical risk in conversations with 
GPs and clinicians. The model 
incorporates known relevant risk 
factors such as age, sex, body mass 
index (BMI) and ethnicity alongside 
long-term health conditions and 
specific treatments. Timings for the 
model are uncertain.
The conditions identified 
originally remain unchanged with 
two additions:
• chronic kidney disease
(stage 5) and those undergoing 
dialysis; and
• adults with Down’s Syndrome.
Model for support Centralised and universal 
offer to all who met 
CEV criteria.
The government’s early lessons 
learned review concluded that 
the speed and context in which 
the Programme was developed 
meant that it was largely offered 
universally - resulting in poor 
targeting and inefficient use 
of funds. It noted that, should 
shielding be needed again, adopting 
a local support model could improve 
flexibility and potentially be more 
cost-effective.
Support offered to all CEV people 
as set out below.
Registering for 
help and reporting 
requests to 
local authorities
The Government Digital 
Service (GDS) set up a digital 
service which consisted of 
a website, an automated 
telephone helpline and other 
services required to collect, 
store and share information 
on the support needs of 
CEV people.
GDS shared information 
from the website with 
the contact centre and 
local authorities.
Missing or inaccurate telephone 
numbers in NHS patient records 
caused problems when trying to 
contact CEV people.
Local authorities unable to 
feedback data inaccuracies and 
allows users to see changes 
immediately. GDS has developed an 
accounts-based system for people 
to request help: people can login, 
review and update personal details 
and support preferences.
A new web-based national support 
system (national shielding service 
system) was set up for CEV people 
to register for help which used the 
accounts-based system.
Local authorities could use this 
national support system to help 
CEV people access a supermarket 
priority slot or support with 
shopping or access to basic care.
Food provision Doorstep food box delivery 
service provided to CEV 
people, at their request.
That local support along with 
greater use of supermarket 
deliveries would be more efficient.
No offer of centrally commissioned 
food boxes.
Local authorities supported 
CEV people with access to food. 
Government provided £32 million 
non-ringfenced funding to unitary 
and county councils in England to 
support CEV people (£14.60 per 
head as one off payment) between 
5 November and 2 December, 
including for food support and 
basic care.
Protecting and supporting the clinically extremely vulnerable during lockdown Part Four 49 
Figure 14 continued
Lessons learned and applied in second lockdown, November 2020
Features Phase one of shielding
(22 March – 1 August 2020)
Developments and lessons learned Lockdown two
(5 November – 2 December 2020)
Basic care Government asked local 
authorities to offer to 
provide basic care for 
CEV people.
The term ‘basic care’ caused some 
confusion as many local authorities 
are required to provide social care, 
which has a statutory definition.
Guidance to local 
authorities changed.
Amended terminology to ‘basic 
support’ to make this clearer.
Medicines CEV people could get help 
through the medicines 
delivery service, and 
register for help from NHS 
Volunteer Responders.
No specific learning point. No change.
CEV people could still get help 
through the medicines delivery 
service, and register for help 
from NHS Volunteer Responders.
Sharing data 
across central and 
local government
Systems not capable of 
‘speaking’ to each other 
across hospital, primary 
care, specialist and adult 
social care services.
Possible solutions discussed across 
DHSC, other key departments, and 
wider local authority stakeholders.
Systems still not capable of 
‘speaking’ to each other although 
the new national shielding 
service system aimed to improve 
government’s ability to view and 
analyse data on CEV people and 
their needs.
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis of documents from the Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government, Department of
Health & Social Care, NHS England & NHS Improvement, and Government Digital Service
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Appendix One
Our audit approach
1 See Figure 15.






As part of our fieldwork we:
• interviewed central government representatives;
• interviewed representatives from a range of other organisations, such as charities, representative groups;
• conducted five fieldwork case studies with Liverpool, Devon, Brent, Warwickshire and Bradford;
• analysed key central government evidence and documents relating to the programme;
• reviewed commercial arrangements; and
• analysed NHS Digital shielded patient list, and healthcare activity and outcomes data, Government Digital
Service dashboard data, and Office for National Statistics data from the Shielding Behavioural Survey.
Our evaluative 
criteria Identifying clinically extremely 
vulnerable people
The government quickly 
established robust and clear 
criteria on who was most 
at risk.
The government made best 
use of existing information.
Information was shared safely 
and appropriately.
The government quickly 
established who needed 
help and had a system for 
communication. It was able to 
stop people falling between the 
gaps and did not solely rely on 
people registering themselves.
Outcomes and lessons learned
Clinically extremely vulnerable 
people were protected from 
the virus.
Government has learnt and 
applied lessons to improve 
during the scheme’s lifetime.
Government has learnt and 
applied lessons to improve in 
the long term.
Supporting clinically extremely 
vulnerable people
The government gave clear 
guidance and communication 
to individuals and care 
providers on how to shield, 
and how to get support.
The government put in place 
support contracts which were 
value for money, at a fast pace.
CEV people got the support 
they needed, and when they 
needed it, and it was right for 
people’s specific needs.
The objective of 
government To minimise mortality and severe illness among Clinically Extremely Vulnerable (CEV) people from COVID-19.
How this will 
be achieved By providing them with public health guidance and support to stay at home and avoid all non-essential contact. 
To help them stay at home, CEV people could get help accessing food, medicine and care, arranged through 
the shielding programme (the Programme).
Our conclusions
The shielding programme was a swift government-wide response to protect clinically extremely vulnerable people 
against COVID-19, pulled together at pace in the absence of detailed contingency plans. Government recognised 
the need to provide food, medicines and basic care to those CEV people shielding to help meet its objective of 
reducing the number of people suffering from severe illness and dying from COVID-19. There was impressive initial 
support offered to many people, with food provided to just over 500,000 people. Although the need to support 
was urgent, it took time for people to be identified as CEV, and therefore access formal support. This followed 
challenges extracting data from different IT systems and the understandable need for GPs and trusts to review 
the List of vulnerable people from their clinical perspective.
DHSC is confident that shielding has helped to protect CEV people and it is clear that many CEV people benefited 
from the support the Programme provided. However, given the challenges in assessing the impact of shielding 
on CEV people’s health, government cannot say whether the £300 million spent on this programme has helped 
meet its central objective to reduce the level of serious illness and deaths from COVID-19 across CEV people. 
Departments have learned lessons from the first iteration of shielding from March to August 2020 and applied 
many of these to shielding during the second lockdown in November 2020.
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Appendix Two
Our evidence base
1 We assessed the effectiveness of the shielding programme (the Programme). 
We analysed how effectively the Department of Health & Social Care (DHSC) and 
NHS Digital identified people who were most clinically vulnerable to the virus and 
how effectively they supported these people in terms of providing food, medicine 
and basic support under the Programme.
2 We analysed NHS Digital shielded patient list (the List) data and healthcare 
activity and outcomes data, Government Digital Service dashboard data, and 
Office for National Statistics data from the shielding behavioural survey.
3 We interviewed central government representatives from the Ministry of 
Housing, Communities & Local Government (MHCLG), DHSC, NHS England & 
NHS Improvement (NHSE&I), the Department for Environment, Food & Rural 
Affairs (Defra), the Department for Work & Pensions (DWP), NHS Digital and the 
Government Digital Service (GDS).
4 We interviewed representatives from a range of other organisations. 
These included representative groups including the Local Government Association 
and the Association of Directors of Public Health. We also spoke to and/or considered 
evidence from charities who represent people who were among those advised to 
shield. They include National Voices, Carers UK, Age UK, the Neurological Alliance, 
Kidney Care UK, Versus Arthritis, The Patients Association, Scope, the Asthma UK 
and British Lung Foundation Partnership.
5 We reviewed documents relating to the development of the List, governance 
and reporting arrangements, communication between DHSC, NHSE&I and 
clinically extremely vulnerable (CEV) people. We also reviewed documents 
outlining engagement with local authorities.
6 We reviewed commercial arrangements relating to the DWP contact centre 
and Defra contracts with Bidfood and Brakes.
7 We conducted five case study interviews with local authorities in October 
and November with Liverpool, Devon, Brent, Warwickshire and Bradford. We also 
spoke with members of the Stakeholder Engagement Forum.
Protecting and supporting the clinically extremely vulnerable during lockdown Appendix Three 53 
Appendix Three
Definition of clinically extremely vulnerable groups 
(March 2020)
1 Solid organ transplant recipients.
2 People with specific cancers:
• People with cancer who are undergoing active chemotherapy or radical 
radiotherapy for lung cancer. 
• People with cancers of the blood or bone marrow such as leukaemia, 
lymphoma or myeloma who are at any stage of treatment. 
• People having immunotherapy or other continuing antibody treatments 
for cancer.
• People having other targeted cancer treatments which can affect the immune 
system, such as protein kinase inhibitors or pharmacological inhibitors of the 
enzyme poly ADP ribose polymerase (PARP). 
• People who have had bone marrow or stem cell transplants in the last 
six months, or who are still taking immunosuppression drugs. 
3 People with severe respiratory conditions including all cystic fibrosis, 
severe asthma and severe chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD).
4 People with rare diseases and inborn errors of metabolism that significantly 
increase the risk of infections (such as severe combined immunodeficiency 
disease (SCID), homozygous sickle cell).
5 People on immunosuppression therapies sufficient to significantly increase 
risk of infection.
6 People who are pregnant with significant heart disease, congenital or acquired.
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Appendix Four
Commercial arrangements 
1 See Figure 16. 
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Figure 16
Commercial arrangements on key shielding contracts from 20 March 2020
The Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs awarded a contract for doorstep delivery of food boxes.
The Department for Work & Pensions awarded a contract for an outbound contact centre
Awarding body Department for Environment, Food 
and Rural Affairs (Defra)
Department for Work & Pensions (DWP)
Suppliers Brakes and Bidfood Serco
Contract for Doorstep delivery of food boxes Outbound contact centre
Contract spend £200.2 million £17.5 million
Procurement route Urgent Regulation 32(2)(c) direct award Urgent Regulation 32(2)(c) direct award from 
call centre framework contract
Conflicts of interest Considered. None reported. Not noted in 
regulatory procurement report
Considered. None reported. Noted in 
regulatory procurement report.
Market engagement Thirty-four providers approached in market 
engagement exercise (19 March) exploring 
range of delivery models
Eight providers on contact centre framework, 
all of whom approached
Provider selection Only two providers Defra reported were willing 
to negotiate on service
Only framework provider DWP reported had 
capacity to meet requirement
Service dates 27 March to 3 July with three-month 
extension option
20 March to 11 June with six-month 
extension option
Contract signature 23 April, with weekly letters of intent from
27 March
5 April
Contract transparency Contract award details published: 
EU – 6 May
UK Contracts Finder – 6 May
Contract award details published:
EU – Not applicable
UK Contracts Finder – 30 April
Payment mechanism Flat content/packing fee per box
Delivery cost per box varies according to 
weekly delivery volumes
Hourly rates for available call centre agent 
hours. Management fee varies according to 
number of agents deployed. Fixed set-up costs
Termination clauses Termination for convenience – 45 days’ notice Termination for convenience – 
three months’ notice
Contract extensions Extension 3 July to 3 September Extension at reduced capacity 12 June to 
23 July
Extension for stand-by services 24 July to 
19 September
Contract end Termination notice served 22 June to end 
contract 6 August; £3.8 million exit costs
19 September
Note
1 The £17.5 million cost of the contact centre relates to Serco contract only. Elsewhere in the report we use £18.4 million as cost of whole
contact centre service, which also includes programme management payments to KPMG.
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis of Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs and Department for Work & Pensions information
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